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ABSTRACT 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the US military was apparently considered to be a 
significant threat by the Brazilian Armed Forces.  Other military establishments in the 
Hemisphere likewise expressed a lack of confidence, and even a sense of fear, regarding 
the North Americans.  After an ‘opening’ in military relations between Brazil and the 
United States, directed by General Barry McAfree, commander-in-chief of the US 
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in the mid 1990s, Brazilian military sentiment 
regarding the US marginally improved.  Nevertheless, by the end of the 1990s and the 
beginning of this Century, the Brazilian Armed Forces again felt threatened by the 
unilateralism of the US military. 
 
 This work examines the the concept of ‘defense diplomacy’ and the process by which 
the  Clinton Administration initiated an experiment in conjunction with the National Defense 
University (Fort Leslie McNair, Washington, DC), at the request of the Deputy Assitant 
Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs,  that established between 1999 and 
2001 a broader understanding of possible US defense diplomacy for the subsequent seven 
years.  I was an invited participant in this experiment, along with more than two dozen North 
American and Latin American academics, including Brazilians, the aim of which was to 
complete a proposal under contract with the Defense Department.  Although it was ended 
soon after the Bush Administration began, this experiment, and the broader concept of 
‘defense diplomacy,’  may well have represented an important option for future hemispheric 
military relations. 
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“All diplomacy is a continuation of war by other means.”  
Chou En-Lai 
 
“The great nations have always acted like gangsters, and the small nations like prostitutes.” 
Stanley Kubrick1 
 
“Walters, you may be good soldier, but diplomat you are not.” 
Soviet Ambassador to Brazil Andrei Fromin, 19642 
   
  What is meant by the term, defense diplomacy?  Absent any obvious definition, and in 
view of the cynical observation of Chou En-Lai, one is left with the immediate impression 
that defense diplomacy is merely an overt manifestation of the failure of diplomacy, an edging 
ever closer to active warfare. However, if filmmaker Stanley Kubrick’s comment is 
considered seriously, perhaps defense diplomacy is the only avenue left to a less powerful 
country when the formal political machinations of a big power, a hegemonic power, have not 
included it in the grand political design. Brazil is, of course, a powerful, if less powerful, 
country, although it has been difficult to identify a cogent and consistent US foreign policy 
strategy for Brazil over the past three decades. In many respects, the traditionally close 
fraternal ties between the US and Brazilian armed forces have created a natural bridge 
between those two institutions, and hence an important possibility for meaningful and creative 
diplomacy.  In an important sense, the United States has defined one of its two concepts of 
“Defense Diplomacy” in its historical relations with Brazil, viz., close brother-officer 
relations, effective consultation and collaboration, and overt expressions of mutual respect.  
The other pattern of US defense diplomacy, considerably more common in the Twentieth 
Century, involved propping up sympathetic authoritarian regimes through military and other 
financial assistance. 
 The following study represents an historical account of a promising, if brief, attempt to 
initiate a third way in US-Brazilian defense diplomacy with a new and promising model 
between 2000 and 2001 in which I played a small part. My central focus is as a minor 
participant and observer of this attempt, led by US Army Colonel John Cope and the 
Institute for National Strategic Studies,3 of the US National Defense University. Its purpose 
                                                           
1 Quoted in The Guardian (UK), June 5, 1963. 
2 As reported by Walters.  Fromin had just criticized Vernon Walters (and all Americans) for speaking 
only English, and Walters had sharply rebuked him in Russian and then challenged him to have that 
discussion in Portuguese.  Walters, 1978: 384. 
3 John A. Cope, Colonel (retired) of the US Army, has the following cv listed on the INSS web page: 
“Mr. Cope is a specialist in Western Hemisphere security affairs (including North American issues), U.S. 
policy for Latin America and the Caribbean, civil-military relations, and defense education. Before 
retiring from the Army, Colonel Cope served in the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, 
U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Army South, U.S. Army War College, and the 101st Airborne 
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was to provide a balanced proposal within the broader definition of US defense diplomacy 
in Latin America, including a special focus on Brazil, under contract to the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs (DASD/IAA) in the latter part of 
the Clinton Administration, Pedro Pablo Permuy. The focus was upon structuring a 
reasoned analysis of existing conditions as a basis for collaborative and person-to-person 
US defense diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere during the period 2001 to 2008,4 and 
was itself based upon direct civilian, and civilian-to-military contacts, as opposed to 
military-to-military contacts that typified the two previous models of defense diplomacy 
employed by the US.5   
 A number of Latin American scholars of civil-military relations, and a similar but varying 
number of North American scholars and political practitioners were invited to a series of 
seminars at Fort Leslie McNair in Washington, DC, over the one-year period. In the course of 
several seminars, an outline of possible US Defense Department areas of possible concern and 
engagement were mapped out (see: Appendices I and II). Their efforts resulted in a 
submission that outlined the security challenges in Latin America, appropriate US Southern 
Command (SOUTHCOM) responses, and hence proposed a strategy for US defense 
diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere, 2001-2008. I was an invited participant in this effort.  
The effective suspension of this proposal, and hence its failure to have a significant impact on 
US government policy during the proposed period, can be clearly, if unsatisfactorily, 
explained in a historical and political context. It is the central thesis of this study that this 
failed proposal nonetheless pointed the way to an updating and possible improvement of US 
defense diplomacy vis-à-vis one of the countries involved, Brazil, and is reflective of a 
potential direction that could be initiated at any moment in the future.   
 It is necessary to qualify this study with the little-known observation that US federal 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Division. Past projects at INSS include creating the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies and 
evaluating the effectiveness worldwide of U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET). 
Recent research has focused on examining security cooperation in the Caribbean Basin as in integral part 
of U.S. homeland defense, studying U.S. defense relations with Canada and Mexico, assessing U.S. 
Colombia policy, and measuring progress and risks of Colombia’s Democratic Security. His paper, 
"Colombia's War: Toward a New Strategy," was published in INSS's Strategic Forum series (#194). Mr. 
Cope has contributed articles and chapters on regional 
security and defense issues in National Defense University (NDU) and other U.S. and foreign 
publications. Mr. Cope holds a M.A. from Duke University and a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy. 
He has taught at the U.S. Military Academy, the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Marine Corps War 
College, components of the NDU, and the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute.” 
4 Hence it stressed civilian expertise in military matters, and sought to use this effectively, especially as 
regarded the Latin American participants. 
5 I asked for and received permission (in March, 2008) from Colonel Cope to discuss this project.  My 
interpretation, of course, is my own and in no way reflects the views of the INSS, the National Defense 
University, the US Department of Defense or Colonel Cope. 
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government relies heavily on commissions, committees and organizations of concerned 
participants, to formulate much of its policy. In foreign affairs, for example, the Council on 
Foreign Relations, a private organization with semi-official status, is a crucial formulator of 
proposals for US foreign policy. Membership is by invitation, and carries with it the burden of 
public service. Indeed, this pattern of private policy proposals, followed by public recognition 
and adoption or rejection in the formal political processes, is widely practiced in US 
government. Earlier manifestations of US defense diplomacy have been highly individualized 
and centered usually on single charismatic actors, as will be described below. The central 
focus of this paper involves a commission, under contract to the Defense Department, and 
focused on Latin America. The Brazilian component of that commission, two mid-career, 
highly educated and promising individuals with close military ties, both of whom remain in 
important inter-American defense educational positions, points to its continuing impact 
despite the failure of the George W. Bush Administration to adopt it as a framework for 
hemispheric policy.  
 Among the most puzzling phenomena of Latin American politics are the wavelike and 
surprisingly uniform natures of historical periods of authoritarianism and democracy across 
the region, given the great disparity between the character and development levels of the very 
different Latin American societies. Exogenous and endogenous variables have been proposed 
to explain this conundrum, usually as single-causal explanations, and with relatively little 
explanatory power. Chief among the exogenous variables in the last wave of authoritarianism 
in the 1960s and 1970s were the direct influence of US foreign policy, and phobic military 
responses to putative threats of communism. Primary endogenous explanations have revolved 
around military establishments qua institutions, usually the direct instruments of 
authoritarianism, and have included deep social phenomena (e.g., inequality, alienation, 
isolation), social irritants (e.g., crime, corruption), and the sense of a breakdown in 
fundamental institutions, including the organizational integrity of the military, and even 
military representation of the unfelt needs (breakdown?) of an incipient middle class (Nun, 
1967; Zirker, 1998). The post-Cold War period, however, has been a dramatic period of 
democratization in Latin America, with a deepening of grass-roots voluntary associations as 
well as the establishment of national-level representative democracy, delaying, at the very 
least, any possible new “wave” of military interventions. 
 In an important sense, almost all US diplomacy in Brazil has been “defense diplomacy,” 
and Brazilian aspirations to world power status have frequently run into US defense policy. 
Perhaps the most painful of these, given Brazil’s loyal and effective support of the US efforts 
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in WWII, was the decision to make Argentina, and not Brazil, a Major Non-NATO Military 
Ally in 1998, at the time only the eighth such ally, and following New Zealand, a country that 
had also fought with General Mark Clark’s Fifth Army in Italy (the New Zealand Corps took 
Monte Cassino from the Germans in 1944), in 1997. At the time, Brazil had been 
campaigning to fill one of the promised Permanent Security Council Seats in the UN,6 and 
Argentina’s competitive bid was seen in the context of this US appointment.  This followed 
two decades US pressures to modify Brazil’s emerging nuclear policies, and hence Brazil’s 
drive to world power status, and undermined Brazil’s special bi-lateral military relationship 
with the United States. The death-knell of US Defense Diplomacy in Brazil had been heard 
sometime before 1998, although the decision to accord Argentia, and not Brazil, MNNA 
status reminded the FAB of its demise. 
 
VERNON WALTERS AND THE FORMATION OF US DEFENSE DIPLOMACY 
WITH BRAZIL 
 
 
   Brazil has certainly felt the critical need for armed forces in the last century. Although 
the last overt cross-border military threat to Brazil may have been the War of the Triple 
Alliance in the Nineteenth Century, the São Paulo revolt in 1932, and numerous other military 
threats to Brazil’s well being, including a possible need to invade Argentina in 1940,7 have 
continually reminded the FAB of its fundamental role in Brazilian society. Hence, while the 
peaceful stabilization of Brazil’s borders through the Barão do Rio Branco’s diplomatic 
maneuverings in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries may have seemed to 
attenuate the need for a Brazilian military strike force, WWII, starting with German U-boat 
attacks on vital Brazilian shipping, quickly re-awakened national awareness of a need for 
military preparedness. It can be argued that this led both to and from US defense diplomacy. 
The origins of modern US defense diplomacy in Brazil stem from an emotional 
request for help from Franklin Delano Roosevelt, following the bombing of Pearl Harbor and 
Brazil’s subsequent sympathetic expression of solidarity. Despite the latent German 
sympathies of many of the senior Brazilian military officers and government advisors, 
including General Góis Monteiro, President Roosevelt’s personal appeal persuaded Vargas 
                                                           
6 The permanent seats have been disputed based largely upon regional jealosies, and have never been 
implemented. 
7 Bandeira discusses this important moment (Bandeira, 2007: 406). 
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(with the help of a US$20 million credit for the new national steel mill in Volta Redonda) to 
provide for the US use of military bases in the Northeast, and Brazil’s formal diplomatic 
break with the Axis powers Bandeira, 20007: 392). Between February and August of 2002 
German U-boats had sunk 20 Brazilian vessels, causing Vargas to announce that a state of 
belligerence existed between Brazil and Germany (Moniz Bandeira, 2003: 202-203), and 
eventually to declare war. The US had struggled with several Latin American countries to 
gain military commitments from them.  Brazil was, by far, the most responsive to these 
military diplomatic maneuverings.8 
The subsequent formation and training of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) of 
approximately 25,000 soldiers, which fought with General Mark Clark’s Fifth Army and was 
to make a major impact in the Allies’ Italian campaign, provided the basis for a new US 
defense diplomacy with Brazil. While an analysis of this important collaboration is beyond 
the scope of this paper, two elements of it are crucial. First, the central importance, once 
civilian authorities had committed Brazil to war, that Brazilian military personnel placed on 
the inclusiveness imbued by the collegial and respectful attitude toward them by senior US 
officers; and second, the introduction to the Brazilian Army of then-Major Vernon Walters, 
US Army, a linguist and intelligence officer who had quickly mastered Brazilian Portuguese, 
and became the liaison officer and brother-in-arms of the Brazilians in FEB. As regards the 
first concern, memoirs of the FEB abound with effusive praise for the respect and deference 
accorded them by the North Americans. For example, Joaquim Xavier da Silveira, noting the 
high regard held for the members of FEB by General Clark, goes on to emphasize the respect 
that specific senior US officers held for the FEB: 
 
O General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., considerado um dos mais brilhantes 
comandantes da II Guerra, homem de poucas palavras, tinha uma fé inabalável na 
capacidade de combate a FEB.  Após a guerra, sua voz era uma das mais 
autorizadas a falar este respeito.  Nunca deixou de citar a contribuição da FEB em 
palavras mais positivas.  O General Vernon Walters, Oficial de Ligação FEB-V 
Exército, é a mais conhecida testemunha de tudo que se relaciona à FEB.  Passados 
45 anos, hoje Embaixador Vernon Walters, ele ainda assinala o profundo respeito 
que dedica aos camaradas brasileiros das árduas lutas na Itália.  O General 
Charles L. Bolte, Comandante da 34ª Divisão de Infataria, chegou a Vice-chefe do 
Estado-Maior do Exército e foi Chefe da Delegação dos Estados Unidos na Junta 
Interamericana de Defesa.  Suas lembranças em relação à experiência da FEB 
vinham à tona em conversas com colegas americanas e estrangeiros....No 
Pentágono, era conhecido pela simpatia por tudo que dizia respeito ao Brasil.  O 
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Subcomandante do XV Grupo do Exército, que 
                                                           
8 Expressing a clear interpretation of US policy at the time, Walters wrote in his autobiography that “for 
political as well as military reasons it was important that the largest nation in South America take an 
active part in the war against Germany.  Brazil itself was anxious to take its first step onto the world 
scene” (Walters, 1978: 71). 
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terminou sua brilhante carreira como President da Junta de Chefes de Estado 
Maior, em todos estes altos postos sempre demonstrou uma sólida amizade pelo 
Brasil e a firme convicção de que a FEB legou ao Brasil valores, crenças e 
tradições que o engradecem.  Recordava-se de ter acompanhado a atuação da FEB, 
tendo a honra de representar o V Exército na despedida do General Mascarenhas e 
comitiva no Aeroporto Capidichino, em Nápoles, no dia 6 de Julho de 1945.  O 
General Jacob L. Devers, Subcomandante do Teatro Mediterrâneo de Operações, 
oficial que recebeu a FEB quando de sua chegada à Itália....sempre recebeu 
pessoalmente brasileiros em visita oficial ou em cursos de 
aperfeiçoamento....Oficiais norte-americanos que serviam com Devers tinham a 
certeza de sua sinceridade, pois falava com a mesma entusiasmo sobre os 
brasileiros quando entre seus colegas de farda....O General Don E. Carleton, Chefe 
do Estado-Maior do General Truscott durante toda a guerra, passou três anos no 
Brasil....Segundo Carleton, a conquista de Montese pelos brasileiros foi um prêmio 
que deu consistência e credibilidade à aclamação da FEB como um símbolo da 
pátria brasileira.   
Os americanos sabiam das limitações da FEB, mas constataram o emorme 
esforço feito pelos oficiais e soldados brasileiros, e em suas declaraçoes, durante e 
depois da guerra, souberam reconhecer o esforço e o valor do combatente 
brasileiro (Silveira, 1989: 224-225). 
 
The use of language here is especially revealing. The US defense diplomacy that had been 
exercised vis-à-vis Brazil in Italy remained extraordinarily successful. It was inclusive, 
respectful, and built upon personal officer-to-officer ties. These very personal testimonies, 
representative of such close personal ties, created the basis for a new and highly effective US 
defense diplomacy in Brazil. At the center of this was Vernon Walters. 
 Walters, who died in 2002, has long been accused to having engaged in covert 
political activities, particularly, as regards Brazil, in supporting the 1964 military golpe in 
Brazil,9 which predated by a decade his role as Deputy Director of the US Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA). His autobiography, while questionable regarding his repeated denials of 
involvement in covert US actions abroad,10 offers a very clear description of his interpretation 
of the new model of US defense diplomacy that he was practicing: his work in defining a US 
defense diplomacy based upon person-to-person contacts that stressed inclusion, consultation 
and inter-personal respect among the senior military personnel of the two countries. Walters’ 
language skills, especially his consummate Portuguese, his shared battle experiences with the 
senior members of FEB, and his position after the War as Assistant Military Attaché in Rio, 
where he introduced and translated for distinguished US military visitors, including General 
Eisenhower, Admiral Halsey and General Spaatz (Walters, 1978: 143),11 continued to 
                                                           
9 In 1963-64, he claims to have turned to his FEB colleagues to put an end to a “whispering campaign” in 
Brazil (Walters, 1978: 381). 
10 Perhaps his least credible assertion is that he was unaware of “Operation Brother Sam,” which took 
place in support of the military golpe of 1964 in Brazil while he was the US Military Attaché, until many 
years later (Walters, 1978:  384-385).  Walters was in Iran in 1952, Guatemala in 1954, Brazil in 1964, 
and so on. 
11 He continually stresses how important it was for Brazilians that these senior US military officers 
continued to visit Brazil and to affirm their respect and gratitude for the impressive Brazilian performance 
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reinforce this alternative model of US defense diplomacy after the war. When he arrived in 
Rio in 1962 as the new US Military Attaché, for example, he was met at the airport by 13 
Brazilian general officers, all of whom he counted as friends (Walters, 1978: 374). 
 It is difficult to decipher the actual diplomatic impact that Walters’ approach had on 
policy outcomes, mostly because of their sensitive nature. At a time when anti-communism 
was the leading US policy, Walters’ influence in Brazil was likely enormous.12 He was 
certainly unequivocal regarding his own anti-communist views,13 despite his constant 
reference to his close relations with Brazilian officers on the left, colleagues such as General 
Argemiro de Assis Brasil,14 and his “good relations” with President Goulart’s dispositivo 
(Walters, 1978: 381). According to Walters, it was his relentless partisanship that triggered 
the Soviet Ambassador’s comment that I have cited at the opening of this study. Walters 
remained “best friends” with General Humberto Castelo Branco after the latter assumed the 
Brazilian presidency, although, as Walters notes, they used great discretion so as not to add to 
suspicions regarding the golpe (Walters, 1978: 381-2). 
It is undeniable that the US-Brazilian defense diplomacy of the 1960s was potentially, 
if not actually, effective because of Walters’ active presence. What should be added is that 
this model of defense diplomacy led directly to unprecedented interference by the United 
States in Brazil’s internal affairs.  As Carlos Fico put it, 
 
A atuação do embaixador Lincoln Gordon e do adido 
militar, Vernon Walters, iniciaria uma fase jamais vista de 
interferência dos Estados Unidos na política interna 
brasileira, que teria como contrapartida a atitude 
subserviente do Brasil de Castelo Branco em relação à 
superpotência, involução diplomática que discrepava da 
tradição brasileira que vinha se construindo, sobretudo 
desde o governo de Jânio Quadros: tanto os sucessores de 
Castelo quanto os de Gordon não deixaram de reconhecer 
ess momento como um retrocesso (Fico, 2008: 137). 
                                                                                                                                                                              
in Italy. 
12 It is important to note that many other US military officers had contacts with Brazilian military officers.  
Indeed, some of them, like Captain Edgard Bundy of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, participated in 
training Brazilian military officers in identifying and opposing so-called “communist” officers in the 
raknks of FEB (Bandeira, 2007: 467-8). 
13 As Walters put it in his autobiography, “The communists and their friends see the need to denigrate 
those who have defeated them.  So they spread the word that the Americans were really behind the 
Brazilian, Chilean or any other revolution they don’t like.  Unfortunately many guilt-ridden Americans 
naively believe them” (Walters, 1978: 385). 
14 Walters refers to one of Assis Brasil’s parties, to which he was invited, in which Assis Brasil declared 
that he had been incorrectly labeled a communist.  Walters said that he replied that he had been 
incorrectly labeled a capitalist and “the long arm of American imperialism,” to which Assis Brasil was 
said to have replied, “Walters, if all Americans were like you, we would not have any trouble” (Walters, 
1978: 380).  
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Walters’ return to Brazil and Argentina in early 1981, as President-Elect Ronald Reagan’s 
special emissary, ultimately, if weakly, reflected this interventionist side to Walters’ 
interpersonal model of defense diplomacy. Argentina’s invasion of the Malvinas the 
following year could easily have been encouraged by his reaffirmation of close fraternal ties, 
as per his previous model of US defense diplomacy. Both Argentina’s and Brazil’s shock at 
the subsequent US support of the UK’s military response represented a fundamental shift 
away from whatever remained of inter-personal defense diplomacy in the region, if not the 
end of Walters’ (and his closest Brazilian military colleagues’) political influence in Brazil. 
 
US DEFENSE STRATEGIES IN BRAZIL, 1968-1999: A BRIEF REVIEW 
 
 The presidency of Costa e Silva marked the end of the central role of the Febianos in 
Brazilian politics, and the beginning of a long-term drifting apart of the two military 
establishments. Walters left Brazil for other assignments, eventually serving as Deputy 
Director of the CIA (1972-1976), the US Ambassador to the UN (1985-89), and the US 
Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (1989-91). The terms of engagement 
between the US and Brazilian military establishments had shifted, as had the relationship 
between the two countries. The defense diplomacy of Vernon Walters was now seen as little 
more than hollow actions geared to fit short-term US needs. As Carlos Fico has elegantly put 
it, 
 
Assim é que a longa expectative brasileira quanto a um 
relacionamento especial, que tem raízes na Segunda Guerra 
Mundial, nunca se realizou, e não foram poucos os militares 
brasileiros que se sentiram frustrados com o tratamento 
recebido pelos Estados Unidos após o golpe de 64—
sobretudo pela parcimônia na venda de armas.  Sempre que 
foi necessária, Washington deu a impressão de levar um 
grande conta a opinião brasileira, seja quando precisou de 
suas bases aéreas, em 1942, seja quando decediu eliminar of 
governo de Allende.  Umas poucas cartas amáveis, algumas 
frases adulatórias, por vezes excessivas—como foi a de 
Nixon—, nada mais do que isso (Fico, 2008: 279).  
 
The breakdown of the US-Brazilian bilateral military relationship in the late 1970s 
contributed directly to the growth of suspicion with the Brazilian military establishment 
regarding the long term US designs on Brazil. Hélio Jaguaribe noted in 1986 that “De 1974 
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aos nossos dias vem se manifestando um crescente desentendimento politico, no plano 
internacional, entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos” (1986: 290). Part of this was due, as 
Abraham Lowenthal noted in a recent CHDS publication, to a decline in the diplomatic 
importance to the US of Latin America in general.15 
 US defense diplomacy shifted in the 1980s to demands to support drug interdiction in 
South America, a police function, and to the passing fancies of US politics. The Panama 
Canal came and went as a fundamental concern, as did Brazil’s waxing and waning nuclear 
program. US demands that Brazil break all relations with Iraq, a country with which Brazil 
had had a long-term and close military relationship, during the first US-Iraq war were 
formally, if not fully, honored by Brazil.16 In the meanwhile, the FAB became increasingly 
involved in peacekeeping operations with the UN. A central concern of the FAB remained 
that of national sovereignty, however, particularly as embodied in the vast Amazon region. 
 
AMAZÔNIA: GROWING MISTRUST IN THE 1980s AND 1990s 
 
 Amazônia requires a special mention in the post-1968 policy review. Historically, 
Marshall Rondon and other prominent Brazilian military figures had focused on the Amazon 
as a fundamental—and intrinsically threatened—national patrimony. By the 1980s the region 
was possibly the most clear and orthodox military mission for the FAB. Some observers 
suggested that the surveillance and protection of the vast Amazon region implied direct 
military opposition to NGOs, land occupiers, Colombian guerrillas, and virtually any other 
group that might have sought to inhibit the broad spectrum settlement and development model 
envisioned by the Armed Forces of Brazil. The greatest threat to these rights had been 
characterized by military officers as the “internationalization” of region. 
 Brazilian military resistance to the “internationalization” of Amazônia has a long 
history, a comprehensive discussion of which is well beyond the scope of this paper (See: 
Zirker and Henberg, 1994; Martins Filho and Zirker, 2000). Briefly summarized, the Brazilian 
army has had an integral role—framed in the context of nationalism—from the beginning of 
the Twentieth Century, in internal security, border policy and Indian policy in the region. A 
counter guerrilla action in the Araguaia region in the 1970s, aimed at a communist 
                                                           
15 As Lowenthal put it, “The traditional diplomatic importance of Latin America…declined in the late 
1970s and the 1980s as many Latin American countries expressed their solidarity with the Third World 
rather than with the United States.   
16 The US military alleged that Brazil maintained a missile servicing team in Iraq as per a military 
contract.  
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insurgency, subsequently became a cause célèbre for the military and, decades later, a central 
focus regarding allegations of human rights violations by the Army.   
By the late 1980s, senior military officers, including the Minister of the Army, 
General Leônidas Pires Gonçalves, frequently expressed their hostility toward 
“internationalists” in the Amazon region, particularly environmentalists, Brazilian and 
foreign.17 NGOs were drawn into the focus.18 At the beginning of the presidency of Fernando 
Collor de Mello, in 1989, strident military criticism was reserved for Minister of the 
Environment José Lutzenberger, although following his creation of a Yanomami Indian 
reserve on the Venezuelan border,19 which directly threatened the Army’s Calha Norte 
project, an attempt to create a “settled” buffer zone on the Amazon borders, President 
Fernando Collor de Mello became a central focus of military hostility. What had been a 
highly classified army program, Calha Norte, or “Northern Channel” (or “Trench”), was 
described in 1989 as  “a project of a strategic nature” designed “to promote the occupation of 
the frontier strip along Brazil’s northern borders” (Santilli, 1989: 42). The establishment of 
large, productive landholdings in the region was its central goal.   
Army Commandant General Glauber Vieira noted in 2000 a renewed emphasis on the 
plan, particularly to bring in the state governments of the Amazon region to help to create a 
“strategic” settlement in the areas involved, adding disparagingly that “there are interests that 
want to see [this area] as a huge botanical garden for international pleasure.”20  Calha Norte 
clearly continued to represent an important element of army planning for the region, and 
military officers continued to express their concern over the role of NGOs over the past 
decade (Monteiro, 2000; Zirker and Henberg, 1994).   
 The 1990s represented a significant hardening of the military position vis-à-vis 
the Brazilian Amazon region. Five important events stand out in this regard: first, the 
1991 US invasion of Iraq, which put the Brazilian military in a particularly awkward 
position because of its close military relationship with Iraq; second, the death of several 
Brazilian conscripts in a cross-border raid by the Colombian FARC guerrillas in 1991; 
third, US military maneuvers in Guyana in 1993, which provoked a significant Brazilian 
                                                           
17 He was quoted in the media describing his hatred for Environment Minister José Lutzenberger as being 
similar to the hatred he had long felt for Luis Carlos Prestes, a famous tenente and a leader of the 
communist intentona of 1935 (O Estado de S. Paulo, 11 October 1991). 
18 A March 1990 paper of the National War College (Escola Superior de Guerra, or ESG), identified 
collusion between international NGOs and Indian groups with developed countries “to use Indian areas as 
bridgeheads to internationalize strategic parts of Amazônia” (Wood and Schmink, 1993: 101).  The ESG 
paper reportedly called for drastic actions, including war, against smugglers, drug traffickers, and 
environmental organizations. 
19 The announcement of the new reserve came just before the UN conference in Rio.  
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military mobilization in Brazilian Amazônia near the Guyanese border (Zirker and 
Henberg, 1994);21 fourth, huge Amazonian forest fires in 1998, regarding which 
international firefighting aid was pointedly rejected, apparently on nationalistic grounds, 
by the Commander of the First Forest Infantry Brigade, General Luiz Edmundo 
Carvalho; and fifth, a reported statement (later denied by the US Defense and State 
Departments) by U.S. General Patrick Hughes, Director of the US Defense Intelligence 
Agency, in which he was said to have commented in a speech at MIT in 1998 that “in 
case that Brazil decides to make use of the Amazon such that it places at risk the 
environment of the United States, we have to be ready to interrupt this process 
immediately”.   
Even today, the struggle over property rights in the Raposa/Serra do Sol Indian 
Reserve in Roraima has triggered open criticism of the Lula Government by the military 
commander of the Amazon region, General Augusto Heleno, who flew to Rio in April, 
2008, to speak at the Clube Militar, and publicly opposed the ratification of the R/SS 
reserve, labeling government policies as “lamentable, not to mention chaotic,”22 and 
thereby ignoring Disciplinary Regulations (which forbid active officers from making 
political statements).23 General Heleno’s comments were almost immediately followed 
by civilian opposition statements from Congress,24 from the state government of 
Roraima, especially from the rice-growing settlers, as well as from other military 
officers, including the retired President of the Military Club, General Gilberto de 
Figueiredo, who likened the creation of the R/SS reserve to the political situations in 
Kosovo and Tibet, and hinted at the compromise of Brazilian national sovereignty 
                                                                                                                                                                              
20 “Amazônia preocupa Forças Armadas,” Jornal da Tarde (Brazil), 12 June 2000. 
21 And afforded a brief glimpse of a return of Walters-style defense diplomacy when General Barry 
McAffrey, commander of SOUTHCOM, diffused Brazilian military concerns with a series of officer-to-
officer meetings. 
22 The General announced, at a lecture to the Clube Militar in Rio de Janeiro on April 16, 2008, that “Pela 
primeira vez estamos escutando coisas que nunca escutamos na história do Brasil. Negócio de índio e não 
índio? No bairro da Liberdade, em São Paulo, vai ter japonês e não-japonês? Só entra quem é japonês? 
Como um brasileiro não pode entrar numa terra porque é uma terra indígena?... Esse subcontinente 
extremamente pacífico, que não vai ter guerra nunca, é na verdade um continente que, como aconteceu 
um mês atrás, pode ter uma séria perturbação que pode rapidamente descambar para uma situação bélica.” 
Quoted in Nogeira, 2008. 
23 I am referring here to the Regulamento Disciplinar do Exército, the Regulamento Disciplinar da 
Aeronáutica, and the Regulamento Disciplinar da Marinha, which expressly forbid most active duty 
officers from commenting publicly on political matters. 
24 The national presidents of the opposition PSDB and DEM parties, Sérgio Guerra (PE) and Rodrigo 
Maia (RJ) immediately opened fire on Lula’s Indian policies.  Guerra proclaimed to the national news 
media that “O risco é que se está chegando a um nível insustentável, a um ponto insuportável,” and Maia 
that “O conceito de nação está sendo desrespeitado. O processo [como ocorre] acaba por provocar uma 
insegurança imensa a todos,” concluding that “A preocupação exposta pelo general vem crescendo. Ele 
expressou não só a opinião dele, mas o ponto de vista de outras pessoas também.” Giraldi, 2008c. 
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posed by “international organisations.”: “É a criação de um novo Kosovo, um novo 
Tibete. Deixar só os índios lá e proibir a entrada de outros pode caminhar para isso. 
Pode haver pressão de organismos internacionais como há hoje no Tibete” (quoted in 
Belchior, 20008b). Retired Lieutenant Brigadier Ivan Frota, President of the Air Force 
Club, immediately announced that General Heleno’s remarks “represented a synthesis 
of current military thinking,” and warned Lula: 
 
Que o presidente não se atreva a tentar negar-lhe [ao general 
Heleno] o sagrado dever de defender a soberania e a integridade 
do Estado brasileiro [...]. Caso se realize tal coação, o país 
conhecerá o maior movimento de solidariedade, partindo de todos 
os recantos deste imenso país, jamais ocorridos nos tempos 
modernos de nossa História (quoted in Belchior, 2008c). 
 
Brazilian military fears of the implicit threat to national sovereignty were inflamed by 
the suggestion that the Indian demands in Raposa/Serra do Sol were based upon the incorrect 
assumption of a US Indian reservation model, where a limited degree of national sovereignty 
is accorded the reservations. 
While all of these events are discussed at some length in other sources, they each 
appear to have had a major, even formative, impact upon contemporary military thought, and 
hence underscore a persistent and stridently nationalistic military fear of the 
“internationalization” of the Amazon region’s development model. Ironically, foreign 
corporate and individual landholding for purposes of economic development and exploitation 
are welcomed by the military. Migration and settlement are equated with property holdings, 
particularly in the border regions. Unlimited property rights in Amazônia are seen by the 
Brazilian armed forces as aiding in the establishment of absolute national sovereignty over 
this “disputed” region. 
 
A NEW ATTEMPT TO CREATE A COLLABORATIVE US DEFENSE DIPLOMACY 
WITH BRAZIL: 1999-2001 
 
  
By the end of the Clinton Administration, at the request of a young Latino, the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs (DASD), Pedro Pablo Permuy, 
Colonel John Cope, of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the US National Defense 
University applied for and received a grant from the Department of Defense in 2000 to 
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produce a broadly collaborative, commission-based study. The focus was to recommend a 
path for US Defense Diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere over the period 2001-2008. Col. 
Cope, an academic and retired US Army officer, was responding to a realistic but generally 
unstated vision of US defense policy in Latin America, particularly evident in past (but not 
present) US-Brazilian military relations, that close personal contacts and clear, open and 
honest intentions had represented the best formula for mutually positive outcomes in the past.  
The project was closely linked to the new Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, also sited 
at Fort Leslie McNair in Washington, DC. The important sub-text to this view required close 
contacts between bright and promising individuals early in their careers, people perhaps 
somewhat like the Vernon Walters and Humberto Castelo Branco of 1942.   
Of course, much of US-Latin American military relations had been far from this in 
the previous decade, as noted above.  Indeed, even the major documents emerging from the 
US Defense Department, like the “US Security Strategy for the Americas, October 2000, 
seemed almost hopelessly tied to myths, as evident in its opening paragraphs: 
 
The United States has long defined its security interests in the 
Western Hemisphere in terms of peace, stability, and prosperity. 
From the early nineteenth century until the end of the Cold War, 
the United States considered activity by rival extrahemispheric 
actors and the challenge of competing political ideologies, most 
recently Communism, as sources of destabilization and threats to 
national security. A strategic framework took shape under the 
Monroe Doctrine, which dictated U.S. military activity for over 
100 years and focused U.S. defense policy on preventing hostile 
penetration of the hemisphere. With the end of the Cold War, the 
United States adjusted its diplomatic and military posture to the 
new realities in the hemisphere. The focus of U.S. policy shifted to 
achieving increased interoperability for purposes of international 
peacekeeping and to better respond to humanitarian crises in the 
hemisphere, encouraging the institutionalization of democratic 
norms within defense establishments and engaging in cooperative 
security initiatives to include combating transnational crime (US 
Department of Defense, 2000: 7). 
 
The use of terms like “interoperability” and “institutionalization of democratic 
norms” suggested that the very real challenges of meaningful defense diplomacy 
continued to be unrecognized at the highest levels of US defense strategy in the US.  
Even more intrusive was the pledge to achieve a number of “goals” by 2005, including: 
“A system of civil-military relations in the hemisphere that insures accountability of 
defense policymakers to the public, respect for human rights, rational and transparent 
budgets and security concepts, and increased democratic civilian expertise on defense 
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issues” (US Department of Defense, 2000: 9). While there was nothing particularly 
objectionable to Latin Americans these goals, per se, their declaration in the absence of 
close collegial (military) ties, and hence mutual trust, in countries like Brazil flew in the 
face of past successes, and may have seemed somewhat arrogant in context. 
 The Security Strategy document of 2000 proclaimed a “five-pronged strategy,” 
with the first four parts pledging that the DoD would “remain engaged in the 
hemisphere... support efforts to ensure democratic control of defense and law 
enforcement institutions… support efforts to strengthen effectiveness, legitimacy, and 
transparency of regional and subregional security structures and regimes…[and] support 
cooperative approaches to the peaceful resolution of border disputes and response to 
transnational threats and humanitarian crises.” The fifth strategy, however, opened the 
door for Col. Cope’s initiative: 
 
Finally, the Department of Defense will seek to build mutual confi-
dence on security issues and develop long-term bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation among defense ministries and security 
forces. In this context, the Department of Defense seeks to 
advance the region's understanding of the security concerns facing 
it, develop mechanisms for addressing these concerns, and obtain 
consensus on common principles and concepts of security to 
address emerging threats. The Department of Defense wants to 
foster expanded dialogue and cooperation in an atmosphere of 
mutual respect for sovereignty and understanding of diverse points 
of view (US Department of Defense, 2000: 10-11; emphasis in the 
original). 
 
Col. Cope applied for and received a contract from the DASD, Inter-American Affairs, 
in 1999, and immediately contacted and contracted academics and “political practitioners” 
from the US, Canada, and Latin America. In mid-2000 I was contacted in Montana by Col. 
Cope with an invitation to play a part in the contract/commission, with periodic travel to 
Washington, DC to participate in seminars and presentations as part of the proposal (see: 
appendices I and II). 
 While most of the topics remained constant, it is interesting to note the evolution of 
one key topic and focus between the December 2000 meeting of the group, and the April 2001 
meeting. Joseph Tulchin, the distinguished US scholar and then head of the Wilson Center, 
moved from a general topic, "The Future of the Inter-American Security System," in 
December, to "Advancing U.S. Interests in a New Hemispheric Reality,"  in April of 2001. 
The impact of the 2000 election appeared to have had a role in influencing the project, if ever 
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so slightly. 
 The central focus of the project was to build and extend an analysis of the Hemisphere 
for the period 2001-2008.  Participants worked together to produce a document that reflected 
US concerns, including concerns for the well-being of Latin Americans, in the context of a 
military diplomacy. The selection of the two Brazilian participants, Luis Bitencourt and 
Thomaz Guedes da Costa, was, in my view, crucial not only to the project but to the definition 
of a third way in US-Brazilian defense diplomacy. Both had manifest ties to the military, 
both were civilians, and both represented strong bridges to a new generation of Brazilian 
military officers. Moreover, although occupying quasi-military status today as staff at the 
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies25 in Washington, DC, both at the time could be seen 
clearly as civilians with a great deal of understanding of military affairs. For example, in 1995 
Dr. Guedes da Costa had invited me to a seminar at the Secretariat for Strategic Subjects 
(SAE—this had only recently replaced the military-dominated National Intelligence Service, 
or SNI), where he worked in addition to his position in the Social Sciences division at the 
University of Brasília. His manifest contacts with key military officers in the Brazilian armed 
forces were evident to me at that time. Moreover, he completed a doctorate at that time at 
Columbia University, and his ties with both military and civilian experts in the US were also 
impressive. As a well-known and respected government functionary in the strategic planning 
and security areas, Luis Bitencort, had also established himself as an academic and University 
administrator. By 2001 he was a senior fellow at the prestigious Wilson Center of the 
Smithsonian in Washington, DC, was likewise closely connected to both US and Brazilian 
military decision makers. 
 The topics covered by Guedes da Costa and Bitencort suggest the importance that 
the project accorded to the re-establishment of an inter-personal defense diplomacy for 
Brazil. Guedes da Costa’s topic, “Brazilian Leadership in South America: Possibilities and 
Limits,” clearly fit the earlier Walters’ approach of inter-personal respect tempered with US 
requirements. Bitencort’s project, “The Influence of Globalization on Regional Security 
Calculations,” reinforced Brazilian leadership as a central concern in a Hemisphere in 
which Brazil had become an economic global leader. 
                                                           
25 See: Appendix III.  Interestingly, the Center seems to be focused upon precisely this form of defense 
diplomacy.  The Director, Richard Downes, notes in his welcome, that “the Center also provides an 
opportunity not only to understand the official vision of the U.S. government regarding security and 
defense within an academic, participative and inter-active environment, but also to compare, contrast and 
coordinate their own visions with it.” 
http://www.ndu.edu/chds/index.cfm?secID=145&pageID=91&lang=EN&type=section  
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 In August, 2001, the project was concluded with the writing of final draft of the 
policy proposal. At about that time, a new DASD/IAA, Rogelio "Roger" Pardo-Maurer, 
a former aid to the Nicaraguan “contras,” was appointed by the new Bush 
Administration. Although Permuy had by no means been a “liberal,” his credentials 
were largely academic, and his focus in commissioning the study rational. The 
replacement of Permuy in mid-2001 with this far more “conservative” Latino, who, 
besides his work with the “contras” had been a speechwriter for the head of the Cuban 
American Foundation and was at that time an active officer in the US Army Special 
Forces, represented a major sea change. US concerns in Latin America would once 
again turn to drug interdiction and Plan Colombia, and away from building a broad-
based inter-personal network as part of a comprehensive defense diplomacy in the 
region. 
Perhaps most important in the shelving of the defense diplomacy project, 
however, were the unfolding events of September, 2001. Within days of the project’s 
completion, 9-11 occurred.  The attention of the Bush administration shifted finally and 
irrevocably away from Latin America, and defense diplomacy, and the opportunity for a 
“third way” in US-Brazilian defense diplomacy seemed lost.  It is interesting that in the 
last year of the Bush Administration, in mid-July, 2008, the Administration has 
suddenly discovered, with the re-introduction of the US Fourth Fleet in the Southern 
Atlantic, that the concept of defense diplomacy was once again necessary.26  However, 
it appeared to outside observers that the moment had passed. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
The United States has tended to use very blunt instruments in its military contacts with 
Latin American countries over the past century. The principal defense diplomacy model, if it 
could sensibly be called diplomacy at all, involved the withdrawal of US occupying forces (as 
in Nicaragua in the 1930s), and their replacement with military figures and organizations that 
were trained and later supported with US dollars. US defense diplomacy may have reached a 
peak in a second model, one that was largely constructed and orchestrated by General Vernon 
                                                           
26 As it was reported in Folha de São Paulo, “Diante de reação negativa ao relançeamento da Quarta 
Frota, Washington destacou uma força diplomática-militar para acalmar os ânimos....O contra-almirante 
James Stavridis visitou países dan região e passou a ressaltar a prioridade munánitaria da frota e o fato de 
ela não contar com embarações próprias. Foi seguido pelo número um do Departmento de Estado para o 
hemisfério, Thomas Shannon (Dávila, 2008: A18). It is interesting that Pardo-Maurer was not mentioned 
in this campaign. 
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Walters, whose language skills and position as a brother officer in WWII put him in a unique 
position as regarded the Brazilian military.  
The drifting apart of the US and Brazilian military establishments in the 1970s, 80s 
and 90s cannot be over-emphasized. What had been a close and trusting relationship, though 
perhaps not always in Brazil’s best interests, had degenerated into open hostility and even fear 
by the late 1990s. A new generation of military leaders in Brazil saw the United States’ 
agenda for the hemisphere as a national agenda, and as the proposed hemispheric partners of 
the US as junior partners. The attempt by the INSS and Colonel John Cope to restart a 
consultative, interpersonal and respectful US defense diplomacy in the Hemisphere, within 
the framework of a commission and a grant with the Clinton Defense Department, represented 
a bold, if short-lived attempt with significant ramifications for US-Brazilian defense 
diplomacy. 
 There is a concluding question to this study: why would or should Brazil or the US 
consider implementing and/or improving defense diplomacy? There are two answers that 
might serve to close this discussion. The first is that, short of open military hostilities, there 
will be some form of defense diplomacy exercised by both of these professional armed forces.  
The recent US defense diplomacy campaign surrounting the re-introduction of the Fouth Fleet 
is a case in point. Given the nature of military professionalism, one can expect that there 
would be motivation on both sides, then, to optimize their respective defense diplomacy.  
There lurks a better military answer, however, that was best articulated in a personal comment 
made to me recently at a conference in Santiago, Chile, by the distinguished Latin 
Americanist, Martin C. Needler. Neatly, if perhaps inadvertently, summarizing a central 
concern of this study of defense diplomacy, Needler remarked simply that “diplomacy is an 
important substitute for military capacity.”27 
                                                           
27 Martin C. Needler, in a brief comment made verbally to the author at the 2008 Conference of the 
Research Committee on Armed Forces and Society, RC #24, of the International Political Science 
Association, Crowne Plaza and Convention Center, Santiago, Chile, June 27, 2008.  Cited with the 
permission of Professor Needler. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
INSS Study for Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs 
INSS, 21 December 2000 
"Future U.S. Defense Relations in the Western Hemisphere: 
The Challenges of Change" 
(Study Outline) 
I – Introduction 
 
Forward,  Senior Official from Cohen Defense Department  
 
Preface,   INSS Team 
 
Executive Summary,   INSS Team 
 
1. “The Scope of This Study,”   John A. Cope, Colonel (retired), Institute for National Strategic Studies 
 
2. “Decision Making Structure for U.S. Defense Diplomacy,”   Gabriel Marcella, Ph.D., U.S. Army 
War College 
 
II – Strategic Trends That Could Affect Defense Relations  
 
3. “Transnational Ethnicity: U.S. Diaspora Latino Communities and Implications for Regional 
Security,” Gilbert G. Gutierrez, Ph.D., New World Structures, Inc. 
 
4.  “U.S. Economic Behavior in the Americas: Prospects and Problems,”  Myles Frechette, 
Ambassador (retired), Hills and Company  
 
5. “International Involvement in the Americas: Latin American and Caribbean Engagement with Extra-
Hemispheric Actors,”   Frank O. Mora, Ph.D., Rhodes College  
 
6. “The Influence of Globalization on Regional Security Calculations,”   Luis Bitencourt, Brazil at the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 
Implications for the Defense Department 
 
III – Understanding the Region: Strategic Perspectives on Security Affairs 
 
7. "The Future of the Inter-American Security System,"   Joseph S. Tulchin, Ph.D., Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars 
 
8. “Toward Re-Establishing Hemisphere Security,”   Andrés Fontana, Ph.D., Universidad de Belgrano 
and Fundacion Gobierno y Sociedad, Argentina 
 
9. “Latin American and U.S. Relations in Matters of Defense and International Security,”   Francisco 
Rojas Aravenas, FLASCO - Chile 
 
10. “Brazilian Leadership in South America: Possibilities and Limits,”   Thomaz Guedes da Costa, 
Ph.D., Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 
 
11. “The Caribbean in U.S. Defense Strategy: Contending with Challenges, Coping with Change,”   
Ivelaw L. Griffith, Ph.D., Florida International University 
Implications for the Defense Department  
 
IV – Understanding the Region: Security Challenges 
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12. “The Future of Interstate Conflict in Latin America,”   Daniel Zirker, Ph.D., Montana State 
University - Billings 
 
13. “State Weakness and Insecurity in the Andes,”   Cynthia A. Watson, Ph.D., National War College 
 
14. "International Threats to National Security in the 21st Century: The Role of the Latin American 
Military,"   Richard L. Millett, Ph.D., North-South Center, University of Miami 
 
Implications for the Defense Department 
 
V – Understanding the Region: Civilian Governments and Armed Forces  
 
15. “Defense Reform in Young Latin Democracies,”   Rut C. Diamint, Universidad Torcuato di Tella, 
Buenos Aires, Argentina 
 
16. “Military Institutions in Transition,”    Frederick M. Nunn, Ph.D., Portland State University 
 
17. “Defense Modernization and Latin American Geopolitics,”   Patrice Franko, Ph.D., Colby College 
 
18. “Civil-Military Relations in 21st Century Latin America: Implications for DOD Policy,”   J. Samuel 
Fitch, Ph.D., University of Colorado - Boulder 
 
Implications for the Defense Department 
 
VI – Strengthening the Defense Framework 
 
19. “Understanding U.S. Defense Relations:  Lessons and Lessons Learned from 40 Years of 
Engagement,”   Caesar D. Sereseres, Ph.D., University of California - Irvine 
 
20. “U.S.-Mexican Military-to-Military Relations: Navigating the Labyrinth of Asymmetry,”   Craig 
Deare, Ph.D., Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Raul Benítez, Ph.D., National Autonomous 
University of Mexico and Arturo Sarukhan, Mexican Foreign Ministry 
 
21. “Canada and Security Cooperation in the Americas: Past Realities and Future Prospects,”   Hal 
Klepak, Ph.D., Royal Military College of Canada (invited) 
 
22. "Addressing Common Human Rights Concerns,"   George Vickers, Ph.D., Washington Office on 
Latin America 
 
23.  “Security, Development and the Armed Forces,”  Johanna Mendelson Forman, Ph.D., U.S. Agency 
for International Development 
 
24. "Addressing the Civil-Military Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean,"   Margaret Daly Hayes, 
Ph.D., Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies 
 
25. “Pragmatic Security Partnerships,”   John A. Cope, Colonel (retired), Institute for National Strategic 
Studies 
 
Implications for the Defense Department 
 
VII – Looking Ahead: Future Defense Relations in the Hemisphere,  INSS Team 
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APPENDIX II 
April 2001 Working Conference Agenda 
Room 107, Eisenhower Hall, Fort Lesley J. McNair 
INSS Study For Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs 
"U.S. Defense Relations:  Facing a New Reality  in the Western Hemisphere" 
 
Monday, 2 April                   (• paper presented but not by author)            
 
8:00-8:30 Continental breakfast, Room 107, Eisenhower Hall  
 
8:30-9:45 Welcome, overview of INSS study, discussion of introductory essays 
 
-“Scope of The Study,”   John A. Cope, Colonel (retired), Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, National Defense University 
 
-“Decision Making Structure for Defense Diplomacy,”   Gabriel Marcella, Ph.D., U.S. 
Army War College 
 
9:45-10:15 Break  
 
10:15-12:00 Discussion:  Strategic Trends that Affect U.S. Defense Policy 
 
-“Transnational Ethnicity: U.S. Diaspora Latino Communities and Implications for 
Regional Security,”  Gilbert G. Gutierrez, Ph.D., New World Structures, Inc. 
-“U.S. Economic Behavior in the Americas: Prospects and Problems,”                 
Myles Frechette, Ambassador (retired), Hills and Company  
-"Advancing U.S. Interests in a New Hemispheric Reality,"   Joseph S. Tulchin, Ph.D., 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 
-“International Involvement in the Americas: Latin American and Caribbean 
Engagement with Extra-Hemispheric Actors,”   Frank O. Mora, Ph.D., Rhodes College 
 
12:00-1:30 Lunch 
 
1:30-3:15 Discussion:  Understanding the Region: Strategic Perspectives 
  
-“The Influence of Globalization on Regional Security Calculations,”                      
Luis Bitencourt, Brazil at the Wilson Center, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars 
- “Toward Re-Establishing Hemisphere Security,”   Andrés Fontana, Ph.D., 
Universidad de Belgrano and Fundacion Gobierno y Sociedad, Argentina 
-“Latin American and U.S. Relations in Matters of Defense and International 
Security,”   Francisco Rojas Aravenas, FLACSO - Chile 
-“Brazilian Leadership in South America: Possibilities and Limits,”   Thomaz Guedes 
da Costa, Ph.D., Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University 
-“The Caribbean in U.S. Defense Strategy: Contending with Challenges, Coping with 
Change,”   Ivelaw L. Griffith, Ph.D., Florida International University 
 
3:15-3:45 Break  
 
3:45-5:15 Discussion:  Understanding the Region: Security Challenges 
 
-“The Future of Interstate Conflict in Latin America,”   Daniel Zirker, Ph.D., Montana 
State University - Billings 
-“State Weakness and Insecurity in the Andes,”   Cynthia A. Watson, Ph.D., National 
War College, National Defense University 
-"International Threats to National Security in the 21st Century: The Role of the Latin 
American Military,"   Richard L. Millett, Ph.D., North-South Center, University of 
Miami 
 
5:15-6:45 INSS Reception 
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Tuesday, 3 April 
 
7:30-8:00 Continental breakfast, Room 107, Eisenhower Hall 
 
8:00-8:15 Administrative remarks  
 
8:15-10:00 Discussion:  Understanding the Region: Civilian Governments and Armed Forces 
 
-"Defense Reform in Young Latin Democracies,”   Rut C. Diamint, Universidad 
Torcuato di Tella, Buenos Aires, Argentina 
-“Military Institutions in Transition,”    Frederick M. Nunn, Ph.D., Portland State 
University 
-“Defense Modernization and Latin American Geopolitics,”   Patrice Franko, Ph.D., 
Colby College 
-“Civil-Military Relations in 21st Century Latin America: Implications for DOD 
Policy,”   J. Samuel Fitch, Ph.D., University of Colorado - Boulder 
 
10:00-10:20 Break 
 
10:20-12:45 Discussion:  Strengthening the Defense Department's Framework 
 
-“Understanding U.S. Defense Relations:  Lessons and Lessons Learned from 40 Years 
of Engagement,”   Caesar D. Sereseres, Ph.D., University of California - Irvine 
-“U.S.-Mexican Military-to-Military Relations: Navigating the Labyrinth of 
Asymmetry,”   Craig Deare, Ph.D., Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National 
Defense University and Raul Benítez, Ph.D., National Autonomous University of 
Mexico  
-“Security, Development and the Armed Forces,”  Johanna Mendelson Forman, Ph.D., 
U.S. Agency for International Development 
-"Addressing Common Human Rights Concerns,"   George Vickers, Ph.D., Washington 
Office on Latin America 
-"Addressing the Civil-Military Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean,"   Margaret 
Daly Hayes, Ph.D., Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense 
University 
-“Canada and Security Cooperation in the Americas: Past Realities and Future 
Prospects,”   Hal Klepak, Ph.D., Royal Military College of Canada 
-“Pragmatic Security Partnerships,”   John A. Cope, Colonel (retired), Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University 
 
12:45-1:00         Conclude the working conference 
 
Separate agenda for INSS Study team members 
 
1:20-5:30            Lunch followed by a review of conference results and discussion of INSS report to OSD, 
"Looking Ahead: The Challenge of Defense Relations in the Western Hemisphere"   
Wednesday, 4 April 
 
Individual meetings and research related to project. 
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APPENDIX III 
 
Dr. Luis Bitencourt 
Professor of National Security Affairs 
Dr. Luis Bitencourt was appointed to CHDS in July 2005. Prior to joining NDU, Dr. Bitencourt 
was the Director of the Brazil Project (2000-2005) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars and Visiting Professor at the Georgetown University.  
For most of his professional life, Dr. Bitencourt simultaneously pursued two careers. In the 
Brazilian federal administration, he performed several functions related to research and training in 
strategic planning, international security, public administration, and intelligence (1974-1999). At the 
Catholic University of Brasilia, Dr. Bitencourt was a professor and dean (1987-2000).  
Dr. Bitencourt also worked for the United Nations as a Regional Coordinator in East Timor, as a 
member of the Team of Electoral Experts in Tajikistan, and as a rapporteur for the U.N. Commission on 
Intervention and Sovereignty. He has a doctorate and an M.A. in World Politics from the Catholic 
University of America, and an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Brasilia. His Bachelor’s 
Degree is in Mathematics. His research interests include hemispheric security, terrorism, trade, and 
democracy. 
 Dr. Thomaz Guedes Da Costa 
Professor Acting Dean of Academic Affairs 
of National Security Affairs 
Dr. Costa’s academic career includes experience teaching international relations theory, strategy, 
defense issues, and international political economy for the Department of International Relations 
Department at the University of Brasilia.  
He worked as a career analyst with Brazil’s National Council for Scientific and Technological 
Development, as international market analyst of military aircraft at EMBRAER, and served as a 
researcher and advisor in international security, national defense, strategic planning, and foreign 
intelligence training in the Center for Strategic Studies and the Office of the Brazilian Presidency.  
Dr. Costa has a degree in international affairs from Indiana University of Pennsylvania and a 
Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University. Among his current research interests are 
international collaboration in interagency coordination, United States-Brazil defense relations, and 
curriculum development for security studies. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Pedro Pablo Permuy 
Pedro Pablo Permuy is Director of Governmental Affairs at Greenberg Traurig's Washington office. He 
joined the firm 
from the Office of the Chairman of the House Democratic Caucus of the United States House of 
Representatives, Rep. 
Robert Menendez of New Jersey (now United States Senator from New Jersey), where he at once served 
as foreign 
policy, national security and international trade advisor, as Minority Staff Director of the House Western 
Hemisphere 
Subcommittee, and as Staff Director of the House Democratic Homeland Security Task Force. In those 
positions, he 
drafted key provisions of foreign relations authorization legislation and of the bill that established the new 
Homeland 
Security department. Previously, Pedro Pablo served in the Clinton Administration as Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of 
Defense for Inter-American Affairs where he led senior military and civilian staff in the formulation and 
implementation of 
US national security policy for the Western Hemisphere. In the political arena, he has worked in the 
Clinton-Gore, Gore- 
Lieberman, and Kerry-Edwards campaigns, and as a legislative staff member for Democratic Presidential 
candidate 
U.S. Senator Robert Graham of Florida amongst other notable positions. 
Awards & Recognition 
Golden Hammer Award, Vice President Al Gore's National Partnership for Reinventing Government, 
1999 • 
Department of State Superior Honor Award, Office of the Secretary of State • 
"Servicios Distinguidos" medal from Colombian President Andres Pastrana • 
"Outstanding Public Service" medal from Secretary Cohen 
Education 
M.A., Johns Hopkins University, 1990 
B.A., University of Miami, 1986 
 
Rogelio "Roger" Pardo-Maurer (at the time of his appointment as DASD/IAA in 2001) 
Work 
• Emerging Market Access, Washington, DC, 1992- 
President Consulting/publishing o n  Latin America and US Hispanic markets. 
• A c c e s s  N A F T A  P r o j e c t  Management, Mexico City/Washington DC 1994- 
       Consulting partnership with former chief of Mexico’s NAFTA office. 
 
• Chartwell Information, Alexandria. Virginia, 1990-1982.  
       President Leading US provider of environmental remediation business news/price data. 
 
• AEI American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, 1990 
Latin America and US Hispanic issues specialist 
 
• CSIS-Center for  Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC, 1989  
       Research project on the wars in Central America. 
•  
• UNO/Resistencia Nicaraguense, Central America/Washington, DC, 1986-1989  
       Liaison, Southern Front/UNO. Chief-of-staff for the US representative of the Resistance. 
 
Academic 
• King's College, Cambridge University, UK, 1984-1986. Dipl. (with Distinction) in  
           Development Studies.  (Economic/polities of development). First in class. 
 
• Yale University, New Haven, CT, 1981: BA, History. 
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• Colegio Lincoln, Costa Rica, Central America, 1968-1979. K -HS. 
 
• Languages 
Fluent English, Spanish, German, French,, Italian. Some Russian. 
 
• Publications 
Books and articles on Latin American trade, finance, tabor, politics, security. Forthcoming: Solidarity 
and social Ethic of Worker Microarocapitalism. Have also ghostwritten volumes on competitiveness,  
sustainable development, and the role of cultural values in economic development in Latin America. 
Co-founder, the Cambridge Review of International Affairs, the graduate and faculty journal of 
international relations of Cambridge University. 
 
Civic Service (pro bono) 
• County Electoral Official, Arlington County Electoral Commission, VA (1983-1999) 
• Former Chairman, ACRC Republican Business Council 
• Former Chairman, ACRC Republican Hispanic Caucus 
• Committee Member, Arlington County Republican Committee (ACRC) (1992-1999) 
• Delegate/organizer, various Virginia Republican conventions 
• Speechwriter/advisor to the late Jorge Mas Canosa, Cuban-American National Foundation 
• Advocate representing small business interests on the USA`NAFTA coalition (1993) 
• Electoral Tribune, Costa Rica: officer charged with verifying integrity of electoral process 
(1990) 
 
Military/Reserve Service (USA) 
Currently serving with Bl3 20.. Special Forces Group (Airborne) 
 
  
